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CASE NOTES
Modification of Child Custody Predicated on
Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent: Jarrett u.
Jarrett
State courts in recent years have been forced to decide
whether the post-divorce moral indiscretions of a custodial parent justify a change in child custody.l In Jarrett v. Jarrett2 the
Illinois Supreme Court confronted this question in the context
of a custodial parent who was openly cohabiting with no plans of
marriage. In a 5-2 decision, the court upheld the trial court's
change of custody based upon the cohabitation of the custodial
parent, despite the absence of tangible evidence that the cohabitation was adversely affecting the minor children? The court
also held that the decision did not contravene the constitutional
bar against conclusive presumptions established by the United
States Supreme Court in Stanley u. Illinois.'

Jacqueline Jarrett received a divorce from Walter Jarrett on
December 6, 1976. By agreement, Jacqueline was awarded custody of the three Jarrett children and possession of the family
home.' Walter was given the right to visit his three daughters,
ages 12, 10 and 7, at all reasonable times? In April 1977, five
months after the divorce, Jacqueline informed Walter that she
planned to have her boyfriend, Wayne Hammon, move into the
family home with her. Walter protested, but Wayne moved in.?
Alleging that Jacqueline's cohabitation constituted a change
of circumstances in the children's environment, Walter filed a
petition to modify the divorce decree and award him custody of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980).
78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980).
Id. at 345-50, 400 N.E.2d at 423-26.
Id. at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
78 Ill. 2d at 340-41, 400 N.E.2d at 421.
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 Ill. App. 3d 932, 933, 382 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1978).
78 Ill. 2d at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 421-22.
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the children. On July 12, 1977, a modification hearing was held.
In her testimony, Jacqueline conceded that she and Wayne had
no plans to marry? She testified that she had explained to the
children that although some people thought it was wrong for an
unmarried man and woman to live together, she considered such
a relationship acceptable as long as the couple loved each other?
She also indicated that she had told some neighbors that Wayne
would be moving in with her but had received no adverse comments. In addition, she noted that the children seemed to have a
good relationship with Wayne.l0 Walter Jarrett gave testimony
that the children were always clean, healthy, well dressed, and
well nourished when he visited them. However, he felt that Jacqueline's living arrangement was not a proper one in which to
raise three young girls. Based upon this evidence, the circuit
court held that it was "necessary for the moral and spiritual
well-being and development of the children" to change custody
to Walter.ll
With one dissent, the First District Appellate Court of Illinois reversed.12 The majority held that the relationship between
Jacqueline and Hammon was not relevant unless it was shown to
have a negative effect on the childreds Absent evidence of such
an effect, the court refused to speculate as to what effects the
cohabitation might have.14 In the appellate court's view, Jacqueline's cohabitation alone did not constitute a "change of circurnstances which so detrimentally affected the welfare of the children that it was in their best interests to require a change in
custody."16
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and
reinstated the decision of the circuit court.16 The court held that
the change of custody, predicated upon the open and continuing
8. Id. at 342, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
9. Id. at 341-42, 400 N.E.2d at 422. As to her reasons for not marrying, Jacqueline
stated that she did not believe that a marriage license made a marriage, that it was too
soon after her divorce, and that the divorce decree required her to sell the family home
within six months of remarriage. She explained that the children did not want to move
and she could not afford to do so. Id.
10. Id. at 342,400 N.E.2d at 422. Jacqueline testified that Hammon helped the children with their homework, played with them, and verbally disciplined them. Id.
11. Id.
12. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 937-38, 382 N.E.2d at 17.
13. Id. at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 935-37, 382 N.E.2d at 15-16.
16. 78 Ill. 2d at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980).
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cohabitation of the custodial parent, was not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence, despite the absence of tangible
evidence of a contemporaneous adverse effect on the minor children.'' The majority rejected Jacqueline's argument that custody could not be changed unless the children had suffered "actual tangible harm,"18 noting that the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Acta9 (Illinois Marriage Act) requires
only a finding that a child is seriously endangered to modify custody." In the court's view, to wait until a child is actually
harmed before changing custody "would be to await a demonstration that the very harm which the statute seeks to avoid had
In examining the dangers which confronted the children,
the court noted that open and notorious cohabitation is a criminal offense in Illinois and that the legislature, in enacting the
Illinois Marriage Act, had declared that its purpose was to
strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard
the
The court merged these enactments to form a
17. Id. at 345-50, 400 N.E.2d at 423-26.
18. Id. at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
19. ILL.ANN.STAT.ch. 40, 59 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The pertinent section of
the Illinois Marriage Act states:
610. Modification.
(a) No motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than 2
years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of
&davits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may
endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
(b) The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds,
upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior judgment . . . , that a
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that
the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying
these standards the court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the
prior judgment unless:

....

(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical,
mental, moral or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him.
In applying the new Illinois Marriage Act, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that
technically the Act was not applicable because the appeal from the custody modification
was taken before the effective date of the Act. However, after examining prior law and
the new Act the court concluded that the decision would not be affected by the applicability or nonapplicability of the Act. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
20. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44, 400 N.E.2d a t 423.
21. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
22. Id. at 345,400 N.E.2d at 423-24. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49,394 N.E.2d
1204 (1979).
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moral standard of behavior2sand concluded that it would not be
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial
court to find that the children's moral health was seriously endangered by their mother's example."
The court also reasoned that the children's mental and emotional health could be adversely affected by their mother's conduct. Dangers were seen in the difficulty the children might experience in reconciling their own concepts of propriety with
their mother's conduct and in the potential taunts and jibes the
children might be forced to endure."
In addition, the court held that the decision was not a t odds
with the United States Supreme Court decision of Stanley u. 11linois because the trial court had not presumed that Jacqueline
was an unfit parent. "Rather the trial court recognized that the
affection and care of a parent do not alone assure the welfare of
the child if other conduct of the parent threatens the child's
moral development."M
Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice Moran dissented,
each concurring in the opinion of the other." Chief Justice
Goldenhersh criticized the decision as making cohabitation per
se s a c i e n t grounds for changing custody. In his opinion the record showed that the children were healthy and well cared for
and there was no finding that Jacqueline was unfit. Chief Justice
Goldenhersh further argued that the courts should leave to the
theologians the question of the morality of Jacqueline's living
arrangements, rather than impose the personal standards of the
judiciary. In his view the majority "based its decision on a nebulous concept of injury to the children's 'moral well-being and
development.' 'n8
In the second dissent, Justice Moran contended that the
court's decision had violated the Illinois Marriage Act and the
United States Constitution because the court had conclusively
presumed that Jacqueline's living arrangements harmed the Jarrett children. He argued that under the Illinois Marriage Act a
presumption could not make up for the absence of "actual or
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424-25.
Id. at 345-50, 400 N.E.2d at 424-26.
Id. at 349-50, 400 N.E.2d at 425-26.
Id. at 350,400 N.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 350, 352, 400 N.E.2d at 426, 427.
Id. at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 426-27 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting).
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statistical evidence of harm or danger."" Justice Moran asserted
that instead of changing custody to serve the best interests of
the children, the change was made to punish Jacqueline for her
"mis~onduct."~
He also rejected the majority's conclusion that
the decision did not contravene Stanley v. Illinois. In his view
the majority used a judicially created conclusive presumption to
deprive Jacqueline of her children absent evidence that a change
was in the children's best interest. Since a conclusive presumption was used to determine custody, the hearing afforded Jacqueline amounted to no hearing at all."

A. Actual Harm and the Best Interests of the Child
Despite the arguments of the dissenting justices, the Illinois
Supreme Court's affirmance of the change of custody was consistent with the Illinois Marriage Act and the constitutional principles of Stanley v. Illinois. The court correctly rejected the argument that the Illinois Marriage Acts2 requires a showing of
actual tangible harmss to a child or evidence of an adverse effedMbefore a change of custody is justifiable. Section 610 of the
29. Id. at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 352-53, 400 N.E.2d a t 427.
31. Id. at 353, 400 N.E.2d at 427.
32. ILL. ANN.STAT.ch. 40,@ 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act was adopted from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
TO THE
which was approved by the American Bar Association in 1974. See DESKGUIDE
UNIFORM
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT1 (1974). Section 610, which governs modification
of custody, is identical to 409 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
33. 78 Ill. 2d at 348,400 N.E.2d at 425.
34. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16. Requiring a showing of "actual harm"
is, in effect, equivalent to requiring "evidence of a negative effect" because the harm a
child experiences is the evidence of a negative effect. The terms will be used interchangeably in this Case Note.
The appellate court's requirement of evidence of a negative effect on the children
was partially derived from their interpretation of 602 of the Illinois Marriage Act. 64
Ill. App. 3d at 936-37,382 N.E.2d at 16. Section 602(b) directs that "[tlhe court shall not
consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship
to the child." A strict interpretation of this section can lead to the requirement proposed
by the appellate court. However, such a narrow interpretation is contrary to the primary
thrust of 602-serving the best interests of the child. Additionally, it would effectually
rewrite the modification of custody section. Whereas only danger to a child need be
shown under g 610, the appellate court's reading of 602 would change the 610 requirement to a showing of an actual adverse effect whenever a parent's conduct is concerned. Since virtually every custody change is premised on the conduct of the parent, a
negative effect (i.e., actual harm) would be a prerequisite to nearly every change of custody. A more reasonable interpretation of 602(b) is to view it as a means of focusing

s

-
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Illinois Marriage Act states that the court need only determine
"if the child's environment endangers seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional
child's environment endangers him if it exposes him to a risk of "probable harm."s6
Since the risk of harm usually precedes actual harm, custody
may be altered absent a showing of "actual harm" under the Illinois Marriage Act.
This interpretation is consistent with the guiding principle
of the Illinois Marriage Act that child custody disputes be resolved so as to serve the best interests of the child? In determining whether a change of custody serves this interest, the
dangers of changing custodys8must be balanced against the dangers of failing to change custody.sB
To require a showing of actual harm as a prerequisite to a
change of custody would not be in the best interests of children
because it would significantly increase the number and severity
of injuries to children arising from failure to change custody.'O
the court on the best interests of the child rather than punishment of the parent. See
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 344-45, 400 N.E.2d a t 423. Thus, in cases where the "parent's behavior has been circumspect or unknown to the child," the parent's conduct
should seldom be considered unless such behavior appears to negatively affect the child.
AND DIVORCE
ACT 8 402, Comment. However, when a parent's conUNIFORM
MARRIAGE
duct has been open and is known to the child, it should be considered by the court.
35. 78 Ill. 2d a t 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 40, 5 610
(1977)).
36. Definition of "endanger" in WEBSTER'STHIRDNEWINTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY
355 (5th ed.
748 (1971). See also definition of "danger" in BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
1979).
37. ILL.ANN.STAT.ch. 40, 5 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980); 78 Ill. 2d a t 344,400 N.E.2d at
423 (citing Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952)).
The "best interests of the child" standard is used by most courts in the United
States in child custody adjudications. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: JudiPROB.236 n.45, 237
cial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP.
nn.46 & 47 (1975).
38. Scholars have found that "[alny change in the child's environment may have an
adverse effect . . . ." UNIFORM
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT 5 409, Comment. See, e.g.,
Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978); Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 55 (1969).
The effect, for example, might be emotional harm to a child from the loss of a parent or
friends or physical harm resulting from transfer to a home where the child is neglected
or abused.
39. The dangers of failing to change custody arise when the present environment
exposes the child to serious potential harms. See 78 Ill. 2d at 349,400 N.E.2d at 425. See
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT5 490, Comment (the modification "section is
also UNIFORM
designed to maximize finality (and thus assure continuity for the child) without jeopardizing the child's interest") (emphasis added).
40. The actual harm requirement minimizes the harms of changing custody because
fewer custody changes would be made under such a stringent burden of proof. The
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By its very nature the actual harm requirement mandates that
before custody is changed, the child must be harmed and evidence of the harm must be adduced. Such a high burden of
proof would often preclude a change of custody even when it was
clear that a child was likely to be harmed. Thus, increased physical harm would result in many cases where courts have evidence
of dangers to physical health, but no evidence of harm? For
example, a court might have evidence that a paramour is likely
physically to abuse the child of a custodial parent; yet until the
child is actually abused, custody could not be changed because
evidence of actual harm would be lacking."
The actual harm requirement would make it even more difficult to protect against damage to the moral, emotional, and
mental health of children because evidence of these harms is
usually more difficult to adduce than evidence of physical
harm.43 Moral injury will usually not manifest itself until the
trade-off for this protection, however, is an increase in child injuries arising from failure
to change custody.
41. Evidence of physical harm is often not procurable until substantial damage has
occurred either because the very first harm occurs rapidly and is serious, as where a
parent beats a child, or because the harm develops slowly and is difficult to detect in the
early stages.
42. For an example of a paramour's abuse of children, see Sims v. Sims, 243 Ga. 276,
253 S.E.2d 763 (1979) (paramour of custodial parent administered corporal punishment
to the youngest daughter and a serious beating to the oldest son).
The potential for increased injuries to children probably explains why the vast majority of courts change custody absent evidence of actual physical harm. Examination of
court opinions shows that although custody changes are often premised on potential
physical harms to children, evidence of actual harm to a child's physical health is rarely
cited. See generally cases noted in Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980). Instead, judges recite facts suggesting that harm to physical health is probable. Typical statements are
that the parent leaves the children unattended for long hours, e.g., Mace v. Mace, 9 Or.
App. 435, 497 P.2d 677 (1972), or provides improper nutritional care, e.g., L.H.Y.v.
J.M.Y.,535 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
43. Evidence of moral harm to children is difficult to adduce because the harm is
usually subjective and occurs within the mind. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 Ill. App. 3d at
939, 382 N.E.2d at 18 (McNamara, J., dissenting) ("It might be not only difIicult but
impossible to present evidence showing objective effects that such conduct would have
on minor children. The effects may well be subjective ones that will raise their ugly
heads and make their presence known at some future time.") (quoting Gehn v. Gehn, 51
Ill. App. 3d 946, 949, 367 N.E.2d 508, 511 (1977)). Harms that originate in the mind are
particularly hard to detect in children because children often have difficulty expressing
themselves. As several psychiatrists and psychologists have testified, "[elven when they
have no fear of expressing their feelings, children will often be able to articulate them
only in the vaguest ways, if at all." Litwach, Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM.L. 269,288 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as
The Proper Role of Psychology].
Perhaps the best evidence that moral harm can rarely be shown in children is found
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child has matured.44 By that time, however, the child's moral
values are well formed:' and the evidence of moral injury is evidence of the very harms sought to be avoided-immoral conduct
and its consequences? Exposing a child to an immoral environment can also result in emotional and mental harm?' These
harms, like moral harm, can be difficult to prove because the
harms are usually within the mind. Under the actual harm requirement, although a child was injured, custody would not be
changed in many cases either because the parent or professional
could not prove its existence48or, even if proven, could not es.

by examining court opinions. Examination of fifty court opinions in which custodial parents had engaged in immoral conduct disclosed only one case in which a court found
evidence of actual injury to a child's moral health-Repetti v. Repetti, 1 FAM.L. REP.
2739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (judge changed custody after speaking with the older children-ages 16, 15 and 13, because he was convinced that "their moral concepts lwere]
already being distorted by" their father's cohabitation). Even in that case, however, the
evidence was apparently not sufficient to prevent a reversal of the custodial arrangement
on appeal. Repetti v. Repetti, 377 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). See also cases
noted in Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980) for additional examples of the absence of moral
harm.
Although evidence of moral harm can rarely be shown, numerous courts have nevertheless recognized that moral harm can result from a parent's immoral conduct and have
therefore changed custody. See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980). Courts will
typically justify the change on the grounds that the child was aware of the parent's several acts of adultery, the child was continually exposed to cohabitation, or the parent
allowed the child to witness actual sexual activity. See id. Such showings are evidence of
potential harm to a child's moral health, not actual harm. If actual harm were required,
custodial parents could subject children to immorality of all types, ranging from pornography to actual observance of sexual activity; yet since evidence of an adverse effect
could rarely be shown, the court would be barred from taking protective action. For
examples of cases in which children were allowed to observe sexual activity and custody
was changed absent evidence of an adverse effect, see Jones v. Jones, 175 N.W.2d 389
(Iowa 1970), and Derringer v. Derringer, 377 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
44. See 78 Ill. 2d at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425. See also The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, at 291 n.39.
45. Dr. Benjamin Spock has written of children from ages 6 to 11 that "[tlhe ideas
of right and wrong that their parents taught them have not been forgotten. In fact, they
BABY
have sunk in so deep that they now think of them as their [own] ideas." B. SPOCK,
AND CHILDCARE431 (4th ed. 1976).
46. Some of the harms resulting from immoral conduct that are prevalent in today's
society are venereal diseases, broken homes, unwanted children, and abortions.
47. An immoral environment can emotionally upset a child who disdains the parent's conduct or partner. See Moore v. Smith, 255 Ark. 249, 499 S.W.2d 634 (1973).
Mental and emotional harms may also arise from teasing by other children, 78 Ill. 2d a t
349-50,400 N.E.2d at 425-26, or difficulty in studying due to the conduct, In re Jane B.,
85 Misc. 2d 515, 517-521, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-54 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
48. Psychologists and psychiatrists can assist in proving that a child has been emotionally or mentally harmed. Legal writers, however, have questioned the reliability of
psychologists' and psychiatrists' opinions in the courtroom. See J. ZISKIN,COPINGWITH
PSYCHIATRIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY
(2d ed. 1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
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tablish that it stems from the immoral environment?
It must be conceded that allowing a change of custody absent evidence of an adverse effect on the child entails the risk of
an increase in injuries to children arising from changes of custody. The lower burden of proof creates this risk by allowing
more custody modifications to be made. The drafters of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which was adopted by Illinois in
the Illinois Marriage Act, recognized this. Their solution was to
require that the child's present environment endanger seriously
his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." A mere showing that it is in the general interest of a child to change custody
will not suffice;s1 serious danger is required. As an additional
protection from unnecessary changes, the Act requires that "the
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment
. [be]
outweighed by its advantage^."^^ Unlike the actual harm requirement, the Act does not require that children experience the
harms of failing to change custody. Thus, the modification section successfully maximizes the finality of the divorce decree,
thereby assuring continuity for the child, without jeopardizing
the child's interesP
Allowing modification when a child is endangered presents
additional risks. By acting upon evidence of danger, a judge is
allowed to base custody changes on predictions and presumptions of harm.64This creates a risk that the conduct of a custodial parent may be "labelled" as seriously endangering the child

..

and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL.L. REV.
693 (1974). One commentator has even argued that in the child custody context the psychological and psychiatric professions have nothing meaningful to add to the decisionmaking process. See Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?,
29 RUTGERS
L. REV.1117 (1976). But see The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43,
at 269.
49. See Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U . CIN. L.
REV.647, 662 n.109 (1977).
50. UNIFORM
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT§ 409.
51. See UNIFORM
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT§ 409, Comment.
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT § 409. Although neither the appellate
52. UNIFORM
court nor the Illinois Supreme Court opinions gave more than summary treatment to
this requirement, presumably it was considered in the decision-making process.
A third protection from unnecessary custody changes is also afforded children
through the Uniform Act's refusal to allow a motion to modify a custody decree within
two years of its date unless an affidavit shows that the child is seriously endangered.
UNIFORM
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT5 409(a).
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
ACT5 409, Comment.
53. UNIFORM
54. When a judge acts upon evidence of danger, the judge is generally acting on an
inference or presumption that harm will exist in the future or that it presently exists,
but is undetected.
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to disguise personal biasesss or that a presumption or prediction
will be erroneous.s6 Although such results may not be in the
child's best interestss7and may serve to penalize a parentP8 the
solution is not to preclude judges from issuing decrees based on
potential harm. Rather, the solution is to allow judicial review of
the decreem and to provide judges with legislative guidelines of
what constitutes immoral conduct60 and when it may be considered..' Judges can then use a legislative standard of moral behavior rather than a personal one.6a This would reduce the risk
of improper custody changes without jeopardizing the child's in55. See Lauerman, supra note 49, at 670-72.
56. See J. GOLDSTEIN,
THE BESTINTERESTS
OF THE
A. FREUD& A. SOLNIT,BEYOND
CHILD49-52 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND
THE BESTINTERESTS]
(predictions may
be erroneous because "[nlo one-and psychoanalysis creates no exception-can forecast
just what experiences, what events, what changes a child or for that matter his adult
custodian, will actually encounter") (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 51-52.
58. See Lauerman, supra note 49, at 670-72. It should be noted, however, that the
actual harm requirement would also fail to prevent some custody changes made to punish a parent since a judge is free to define or "label" actual harm as he sees fit. Furthermore, the "penalty" a parent receives is usually less severe in a child custody adjudication than other parent-child actions such as neglect or adoption. Whereas in a neglect
proceeding a complete severance of parent-child relations often results, in a child custody modification after divorce a parent moves from the status of a custodial parent to a
noncustodial parent with visitation privileges and other rights.
59. Illinois courts are allowed to review divorce decrees and reverse the trial courts'
decisions if discretion was exercised in a manner contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 935, 382 N.E.2d at 15.
60. The Illinois legislature has provided its courts with relevant moral standards. 78
Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 425. ("The fornication statute and the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act evidence the relevant moral standards of this State as declared by our legislature.").
61. In order to assure that custody decisions are made to serve the best interests of
the child, the Illinois Marriage Act places some constraints on the use of evidence pertaining to the conduct of a custodial parent. ILL. ANN.STAT.ch. 40, § 402 (Smith-Hurd
1980). The statute reads, "[tlhe court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed
custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child." Id. Illinois case law further
assures that custody changes are motivated by the child's interests by restricting the use
of evidence of past immoral conduct where "the parent's present conduct establishes the
improbability of such lapses in the future." 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424. Cf.
Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HAW.L. REV.1156,
1318 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (to help assure a child-centered focus in
neglect proceedings, past parental behavior should be relevant only insofar as it indicates
a likelihood of further harms to the child in the future).
62. If legislative guidelines are provided, as they were in Jarrett, then the courts
need "not impose the personal preferences and standards of the judiciary" in deciding a
case. 78 Ill. 2d at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting). A question not
discussed in this Case Note is the degree to which a state may constitutionally regulate
moral conduct through its police power. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1202-13.
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terest? Finally, in considering these risks, it should be recognized that predictions and presumptions are not foreign to
judges in child custody adjudications. Judges, for example, must
"predict" which parent will offer the best environment to the
child in making the initial divorce decree? If judges are competent to make predictions of the future before seeing the postdivorce environment each parent will offer, then they should be
still more competent after observing them.

B. Dangers to the Children's Health
Under the serious danger requirement, the trial court could
properly find that Jacqueline's cohabitation seriously endangered the moral health of the Jarrett children? Centuries of
human experience have taught "that a child learns by example,
especially from his parent^."^^ Recent scientific research has
confirmed that a primary role model, such as a parent or cohabiting paramour, has a profound effect on a child's moral values.67
63. Apparently, no legal commentators have advocated a requirement of evidence of
actual harm or an adverse effect to change custody. However, some commentators have
suggested as a solution to biased or erroneous custody changes that only short term predictions be allowed. They argue that since the future is difficult to predict, it is in the
interest of the child not to allow predictions of harm in the distant future. See BEYOND
THE BESTINTERESTS,
supra note 56, at 52; Lauerman, supra note 49, at 672-79. This
approach, however, fails to recognize that some harms in children develop gradually and
do not manifest themselves until the child has matured. See The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, at 291 n.39. The focus should be on the probability of harm and
its gravity. Whether a harm will occur sooner or later should be a component of
probability, not its substitute.
THE BESTINTERESTS,
supra note 56, at 51 ("Each child placement
64. See BEYOND
. . . is based upon assumptions and predictions about children and adults who are designated parents"); The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, at 282 (as long as the
best interest standard is used, "some predictions must be made in custody cases").
65. 78 Ill. 2d at 345-49, 400 N.E.2d at 424-25.
66. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977) (quoting Beck v.
Beck, 341 So.2d 580, 582 (La. Ct. App. 1977)).
67. One study showed that children's moral judgment "responses are readily modifiable particularly through the utilization of adult modeling cues." Bandura & McDonald,
Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of Models in Shaping Children's
& SOC.PSYCH.274,280 (1963). Another study found
Moral Judgments, 67 J. ABNORMAL
that "[tlhe most clear-cut conclusion to emerge from our analysis of the experimental
findings on imitative modeling is that the direct observation of a model who yields to
temptation and deviates from a social norm or prohibition has a disinhibiting effect on
the observer." Hoffman, Moral Development, in 2 CARMICHAEL'S
MANUAL
OF CHILDPSYCHOLOGY 316 (P. Mussen ed. 1970). This study and others were cited in Walter Jarrett's
brief. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20-22, Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 111.2d 337,400 N.E.2d
421 (1979).
Despite the findings of such studies, at least one body of writers has concluded that
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Moreover, the Jarrett children were taught to engage in immoral
conduct not only by example, but by precept as well through
Jacqueline's explanation to them that she considered her relationship acceptable." The children's continual exposure to such
teachings justified the court's conclusion that there was a high
probability that the children would adopt moral standards that
conflicted with the standard of moral conduct established by the
criminal code and the Illinois Marriage Act.
In addition to moral injury, potential harms to emotional
and mental health were mentioned by the courtPBJacqueline's
failure to accept the obligations of marriage or assure the court
that she intended to marry in the near future increased the likelihood of a second "breakup" of the children's primary role models and consequent emotional harm. The children might have
felt insecure as they perceived that the relationship was temporary. Further adverse effects would be likely as the children attempted to reconcile their mother's teachings on morality with
those of their father, their religion, and society.70Ridicule from
"[tlhere is little evidence that many 'immoral' practices affect children in any way.'' See
Developments, supra note 61, at 1320. In light of the research that has been conducted
on child development and moral values, it is difficult to be sure of the meaning of such a
statement. Research for this Case Note disclosed no court opinion espousing such a
broad view. But cf. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 101 S. Ct. 329, 331 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("Nothing in the record or in logic supports a conclusion that
divorced parents who fornicate, for that reason alone, . . . adversely affect the well-being and development of their children . . . over and above whatever adverse effect separation and divorce may already have had on the children."). It may be, however, that
those who feel there is little evidence are referring to the lack of long term studies actually conducted in the home on the effects of immoral conduct on children. If this is the
meaning of the statement, then the commentators are apparently correct. In the child
custody area, for example, such specific research is nonexistent, and according to some of
those who would conduct the research-psychologists and psychiatrisbit may never be
forthcoming because of ethical considerations and the impracticalities of obtaining a
meaningful result. See The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, at 277-79. Consequently, there is little evidence from long term studies in the home that immoral conduct
does affect children, or that it does not. There is, however, extensive evidence from short
term studies clearly establishing that the conduct of a parent or role model significantly
affects a child's moral values and behavior. See, e.g., Grusec, Kuczynski, Rushton &
Sirnutis, Learning Resistance to Temptation through Observation, 15 DEVELOPI&NTAL
PSYCH.
233 (1979);Lubitz & Johnson, Parental Manipulation of the Behavior of Normal
719 (1975). For reference to additional studies on
and Deviant Children, 46 CHILDDEV.
the influence of a primary role model on the moral development of children, see ChiM
Development Abstracts & Bibliography.
68. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 934, 382 N.E.2d at 14.
69. 78 Ill. 2d at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425-26.
70. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 426.
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others was also a possible harme71
Although experience and research have shown these to be
some of the dangers to children, scientific researchers have cautioned that there is much about cohabitation and its effects that
is still unkn~wn.~Vhus,
when a court is faced with one parent
offering a proven safe environment and the other is offering an
environment with serious known and unknown risks and indicating no desire to safeguard the children through marriage, a
transfer of custody is in the best interests of the children.lS In
these circumstances, the Illinois Supreme Court properly held
that the trial court's decision was not contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence.
C. Stanley v. Illinois

The change of custody due to Jacqueline's cohabitation waa
not only in the best interests of the children but also consistent
In Stanley, the United
with the holding of Stanley v. Illin~is.~'
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute
which created a conclusive presumption that an unwed father is
unfit to have custody of his children." The Court concluded that
depriving an unwed father of all parental rights in his illegitimate children without a prior hearing to determine his actual
unfitness, when the state affords that protection to unwed
mothers and married parents, violates the due process76 and
equal protection77clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The Jarrett decision is not at odds with Stanley because of
several fundamental differences between the cases. First, procedural due process was afforded in Jarrett because, unlike Stanley, a meaningful hearing was held without the use of a conclusive presumption. In Stanley, the unwed father lost all rights in
71. Id.
72. See Hudson & Heme, A Note on Cohabitation, 22 FAM.COORDINATOR
495
(1973).
73. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
261 (1975). Cf.,In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J.Super.
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP.PROB.
486, 498, 324 A.2d 90, 97 (1974) (since homosexuality is not fully understood, the court

should be hesitant to allow unnecessary exposure of a child to an environment which
may be deleterious).
74. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
75. Id. at 647-49.
76. Id. at 658. Five of the seven participating justices joined in holding that the
failure to have a hearing was a violation of the due process clause.
77. Id. Four of the seven justices concluded that Stanley was denied equal protection of the laws.
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his children with no hearing whatsoever; a conclusive presumption served in its place.78In Jarrett, however, a full modification
hearing was held.?@At the hearing, Walter carried the initial
burden of proof and successfully established that Jacqueline was
engaged in open and continuing ~ohabitation.~~
If some lesser
as
past
acts
of
adultery,
fornicashowing had been made, such
tion, or cohabitation, then custody would not have been changed
because the "past moral indiscretions of a parent are not sufiicient ground for denying custody if the parent's present conduct
establishes the improbability of such lapses in the future?
Once open and continuing cohabitation was shown, the court
then presumed that the children's moral and emotional health
was endangered? Unlike the presumption in Stanley, however,
the presumption in Jarrett is not con~lusive.~
It may be rebutted under Illinois law by showing that the child is unaware of
the parent's conductw or that the conduct is only temporary?
78. Id. at 649, 655-56.
79. 78 Ill. 2d at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
80. The Jarrett opinion did not expressly make reference to the "burden of proof."
That the burden is initially on the -noncustodialparent is established in the opinion
generally, in other Illinois court decisions, e.g., King v. Vancil, 34 Ill. App. 3d 831, 836,
341 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1975), and in 8 610 of the Illinois Marriage Act. Iu.ANN. STAT.ch.
40, $ 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical Practice Notes).
81. 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424-25.
82. Id. at 347-48, 400 N.E.2d at 425. Although the court did not designate this as a
presumption, counsel for Walter Jarrett conceded that a presumption of danger was involved. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19, 22, 24, Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400
N.E.2d 421 (1979). The presumption arises from the fact that danger is a prediction or
presumption of potential harm.
83. Contra, Jarrett v. Jarrett, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). For a criticism of Justice Brennan's dissent, see Golden, Should a
Divorced Mother Lose Custody Because She Has a Lover?, 3 F a . ADVOCATE
19 (1981).
Even if the presumption were irrebutable, there is substantial authority suggesting
that the irrebutable presumption analysis is dead and has been replaced by an equal
protection analysis. See, e.g., J. Nowm, R. R W ~ &AJ. Yomc, HANDBOOK
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW497-98 (1978); G. GUNTHER,
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW969-71 (10th ed. 1980). The approach may yet survive, however, where there are
independent reasons for heightened scrutiny, as when a fundamental interest is affected.
Id. at 971 n.6. It may be that no fundamental interest or other reason for heightened
scrutiny is involved in Jarrett. See note 104 infra.
84. In re Custody of Boyer, 83 Ill. App. 3d 52,403 N.E.2d 796 (1980) (child was too
young to be aware of mother's cohabitation).
85. A cohabiting custodial parent may show that his conduct is only temporary and
thus prevent a change of custody by assuring the court that he plans to marry or that the
illicit relationship has ceased. Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70
(1978) (mother cohabited after divorce but assured the court she would marry when her
second divorce became final); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 49 Ill. App. 3d 160, 364
N.E.2d 566 (1977) (cohabiting couple separated before hearing and planned to marry
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Custody will not be changed under these circumstances since the
child's exposure to immorality is minimal and a change of custody would be contrary to the interests of the child.86
Even if the presumption is not rebutted, a custodial parent
may still retain custody by showing that, despite the danger, a
change of custody is not in the child's best interest. Such a
showing is permissible because the presumption of danger in
Jarrett, unlike the presumption of unfitness in Stanley, does not
Instead, the presumpmean that custody should be ~hanged.~'
tion of danger is only one factor to consider in determining what
is in the best interests of the child. Under Illinois law, even if
danger is presumed, the court must still determine whether "the
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages to [the child]."88 Focusing on the
likely harms of a change, a custodial parent may retain custody
by showing that, despite the danger, the present environment is
more acceptable than the environment offered by the noncustodial parent:@ or that harm will likely result if the child is torn
from his present home? These procedural safeguards assure
that a change of custody is made to serve the best interests of
the child rather than to punish the parent. Since Jacqueline
made none of these defensive showings, custody was changed after a full hearing.
afterwards).
86. See 78 Ill. 2d at 347,400 N.E.2d at 424.
87. Id. at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424-26.
Chief Justice Goldenhersh expressed concern that custody was changed even though
Jacqueline was not found unfit. Id. a t 351, 400 N.E.2d at 426-27 (Goldenhersh, C.J.,
dissenting). The Illinois Marriage Act, however, has no requirement of unfitness. ILL.
ANN.STAT.
ch. 40, 5 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980). Prior to the Act, a finding of unfitness was
not mandatory. Custody could be changed if evidence established that the custodial parent was unfit or that a change of conditions made a change of custody in the best interests of the children. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264, 292 N.E.2d 145,
148 (1972).
88. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, 5 610(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
89. See Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (1979) (cohabiting
mother retained custody of children under Illinois Marriage Act where the father had
contracted a potentially permanent blinding disease, his income had been reduced as a
result, and his home would be more crowded than the mother's). Although this case
serves as an example, it was questioned by the Jarrett court. 78 Ill. 2d at 348,400 N.E.2d
at 425.
90. For an example of the effective use of a showing that a child will likely be
harmed by a change of custody where immoral conduct was not involved, see Cebrzynski
v. Cebnynski, 68 Ill. App. 3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1978) (stepmother retained custody
after testimony was given that children's emotional health would be damaged if custody
was changed to natural mother).
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A second important distinction between Jarrett and Stanley is found in the allocation and nature of the constitutional
interests of the parties involved. The Supreme Court has "firmly
established that 'what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved
as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.'"@l Once ascertained, these interests are
weighed against one anothere2 with consideration given to the
rationality of the connection between the governmental means
and end, the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
end, and the extent to which the private interest is affected?
In Stanley the private interest in the dependency proceeding was primarily the "essential" right of a parent to raise his
child." The state intruded on this interest in its role as parens
patriae to protect the interests of the child? Although the
state's end of protecting children was "legitimate" and "well
within the power of the State to implement,"w the Court held
that the state's means "spited" its own end in many cases by
.'
Thus, the scheme violated
separating children from fit fahters@
the due process clause because it deprived a parent of his child
without reference to the very factor that the state itself deemed
fundamental to its statutory scheme-parental fitness." The denial of due process was compounded by the fact that the private
interest involved was dramatically infringed through a severing
of all parental rights in the child. The Stanley Court also noted
that alternative means were readily available to accomplish the
state's objective by holding a hearing to determine fitness.@@
The allocation of interests in Jarrett is fundamentally different from the allocation in Stanley. Jarrett was a child custody proceeding resulting from divorce. In such a proceeding the
custodial parent's rights are countered by the state's obligation
91. Stanley v..Illinois, 405 U.S. at 650-51 (1971) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961)).
92. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1194-95.
93. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649-55; Developments, supra note 61, at 1194-95.
94. 405 U.S. at 651-52.
95. Id. at 652.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 652-53.
98. Id. at 653.
99. Id. at 657 n.9.
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to protect the interests of the child as parens patriae.loOUnlike
Stanley, however, a second "countervailing interest"lol conflicts
with the interest of the custodial parent-the right of the noncustodial parent to custody of the child.lo2As a result of this
conflict, the state is "thrust into the role of mediator by necessity."lo3 In such a proceeding it is likely that the combined countervailing interests of the state and the noncustodial parent assure that the court can act in the best interests of the child by
not requiring evidence of actual harm to change custody. Requiring evidence of danger, such as open and continuing cohabitation, would adequately protect the custodial parent's
interests.lOI
100. See R. MNOOKIN,
CHILD,FAMILY
AND STATE476 (1978); Developments, supra
note 61, at 1326.
101. 405 U.S. at 651.
102. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1314. In a case similar to Stanley, but
with more substantial countervailing interests, the Supreme Court approved an unwed
father's complete loss of his child through adoption. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978).
103. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1326. The fact that a citizen initiated the
court action in Jarrett rather than the state raises the question of whether there was
sufficient state action to invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment. See Lauerman, supra note 49, at 712 & 682 n.203.
104. The result of the conflict of rights between a custodial parent and a noncustodial parent in a child custody dispute and the degree to which these rights can be
limited in favor of the child's rights has not been specifically determined by the Supreme
Court. See Comment, Child Custody Revisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act, 56 CHI.-KENTL. REV.671, 675 (1980); Developments, supra note 61, at
1328. However, the Court has held that in an adoption proceeding an unwed father's
interests may be adequately protected by a standard which focuses on the best interests
of the child. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,254 (1978). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has never held,that an actual showing of adverse effect on a child was necessary
for the state to interfere with the constitutional rights of a parent. On the contrary, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that "harm" to a child's health "may be properly inferred," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972), and that when "possible harms" or
"dangers" to children are present, parental rights may be curtailed. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944). See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (when
child's physical or mental health is jeopardized, a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children).
State courts dealing with constitutional rights in custody disputes have generally
concluded that both parents possess equal rights to custody. See, eg., Mayer v. Mayer,
150 N.J. Super. 556, 564, 376 A.2d 214, 218-19 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). Nevertheless,
state courts have generally held that parental rights must yield to the best interests of
the child, particularly when the child's welfare is jeopardized. See, e.g., In re J.S. & C.,
129 N.J. Super. 486, 493, 324 A.2d 90, 95 (Super. C t Ch. Div. 1974). The Illinois courts
seem to have adopted this view. See, e.g., Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101,386
N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (1979) ("the parent's natural rights must give way to the welfare and
best interest of the child"). This approach finds support among legal theoreticians. See
BEYOND
THE BESTINTERESTS,
supra note 56, at 7, 105-11.
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Further support for the constitutionality of the procedure
followed in Jarrett lies in the rationality of the connection between the state's means and end. In Stanley, the Court noted
that the state's end of protecting children was "well within the
power of the State to implement."lo6 The only objection to the
state's action was the failure of the state's means rationally to
serve its end.lo6The procedure in Jarrett has no such flaw. It is
clear that Illinois' end in child custody adjudications is to serve
the best interests of the child.lo7The state successfully achieves
this objective through a means which is carefully "designed to
maximize finality (and thus assure continuity for the child)
without jeopardizing the child's interest."lo8 An integral part of
the procedure is the use of reasonable predictions or presumptions of probable harm,lO, such as the presumption that continual exposure to open cohabitation will probably harm a child.l1°
The only alternative to presumptions is to require evidence of
actual harm, which would result in increased injuries to children.
Such an outcome, far from achieving the state's end of protectAnother potential distinction between Jarrett and Stanley lies in the nature of the
parent's interests. Because of the conflict between the parents' rights in Jarrett, following the dissolution of the family, the interests of the parents are probably weakened. See
Developments, supra note 61, at 1314. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (when minor child's desire of abortion conflicts with parent, family
unit fractured, so interest in safeguarding parental authority and family unit is diminished). The result is that the right of a parent to custody of his child is probably of less
magnitude than the more permanent right of a parent to raise his child, where the parent has not subjected himself to the custodial powers of the court by divorce and a dispute over custody. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 648-49. This result seems
less significant under the balancing test of due process, however, because each parent's
interest in custody appears to be offset by the other parent's interest. The lesser nature
of a parent's right to custody may be more relevant under an equal protection analysis
rather than due process since strict scrutiny would not be applied if the parent's right
was not a fundamental interest. Here again, however, a balancing approach would probably be employed (see Developments, supra note 61, at 1197) which would make the distinction of less importance.
105. 405 US. at 652.
106. Id. at 652-53.
107. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44,400 N.E.2d at 422-23; Iu.ANN. STAT.ch. 40, $5 602 & 610
(Smith-Hurd 1980).
108. Iu. ANN. STAT.ch. 40, 5 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical and Practice
Notes) (quoting Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 5 409, Commissioners' Note).
109. Cf. Developments, supra note 61, a t 1318 (child-centered neglect proceedings
to be constitutional should only be oriented to prediction of the future condition of the
child).
110. But see Jarrett v. Jarrett, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (there is no rational correlation between divorced parents who fornicate and divorced parents who impair the healthy development of their children).
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ing children, would assure its failure in many cases.
As a final due process consideration, the Supreme Court has
required an evaluation of the extent to which the state action
burdens the private interest.ll1 Because the father in Stanley
had failed to marry the mother of his children before she died,
the state completely severed his parental rights.l12 No action by
the father could prevent the result even though the illicit relationship had ceased."' Such a heavy burden on parental rights
is not found in Jarrett. As a custodial parent, Jacqueline had
the opportunity to prevent the loss of her children by accepting
the obligations of marriage or ending the relationship. Furthermore, even though custody was changed, it did not work a complete severence of her parental rights, but only a change from
the status of custodial parent to noncustodial parent. Some parental rights, such as visitation or the right to custody should
the circumstances of the other parent change, were retained?'
111. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
405 U.S. at 649-50.
112. 405 U.S. at 646.
113. Stanley could possibly have regained custody of his children through guardianship or adoption proceedings. The attempt would likely have been futile, however, and
he would have been seriously prejudiced by court restrictions. 405 U.S. at 647-49. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never "embraced the general proposition that a wrong may
be done if it can be undone." Id. at 647.
114. Jacqueline retained her visitation privileges with the children. 64 Ill. App. 3d a t
938, 382 N.E.2d at 17 (1978) (Simon, J., concurring).
Although the core of the Stanley decision was due process, a paragraph of the opinion was devoted to equal protection. See 405 U.S. at 658. The Court held that the state's
failure to afford a hearing to Stanley on his parental qualifications while extending it to
married and divorced parents and to unmarried mothers was a deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Id. Considerable confusion has surrounded this holding because the
majority did not specify the branch of equal protection employed. See Note, Stanley u.
Illinois: Expanding the Rights of the Unwed Father, 34 U. P m .L. REV.303,311 (1972).
Apparently the court was reluctant to deal with equal protection at all. See Note, The
Impact of Stanley v. Illinois on Custody Proceedings for Illegitimate Children: Procedu31, 36 (1973). This
ral Parity for the Putative Father?, 3 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE
makes analysis of Jarrett on equal protection grounds somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, it appears most likely that the majorty in Stanley used the traditional equal protection analysis. See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protection-Classifications based on Illegitimacy, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 908, 911. Under this
analysis, the gender and illegitimacy classification in Stanley was not rationally related
to a legitimate state interest because it "spited" the state's interest. See 405 U.S. at 65253. Application of the rational basis analysis to Jarrett would likely produce a contrary
result. The narrow Jarrett classification, consisting of parents who openly cohabit with
no assurance of marriage, was neatly tailored to protect children by including only custodial parents who expose their children to continuing immoral conduct. See 78 Ill. 2d a t
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The Illinois Supreme Court's affirmance of the change of
custody in Jarrett u. Jarrett was consistent with the Illinois
Marriage Act. Guided by the children's interest, the court's primary concern was not with how Jacqueline chose to conduct her
personal life, but with the effects of that conduct on the children
she had been entrusted with by the court. The decision to allow
modification when the children were endangered, rather than to
await evidence of actual harm, served the best interests of the
children and is consistent with Stanley v. Illinois.

Fred D. Essig

347, 400 N.E.2d at 424; Developments, supra note 61, at 1344. Such a classification,
being only the first step in a finely-tuned procedure to protect the interests of children,
seems consistent with the equal protection clause.

